Taiwan’s Information Manipulation Resistance Model
Doublethink Lab Analyst Report showing Taiwan’s model for building social resistance to FIMI manipulation (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference with Information) draws primarily on Taiwan’s experience in countering disinformation generated by the People’s Republic of China during Taiwan’s presidential and parliamentary elections in January this year.
Two strands of Chinese manipulation
Thematic range of Chinese narratives aimed at sowing doubts in Taiwanese society and questioning the fairness of the electoral process ranged from undermining Taiwan’s security (food and military) to attacks on specific politicians. One of the most intensively exploited narrative threads was the one about the alleged harmfulness of pork imported from the US and eggs imported from Brazil to the health of Taiwanese people.
The second narrative thread was arouse fear among Taiwanese people about a possible armed conflict with the People’s Republic of China in the Taiwan Strait. This information operation consisted of comparing the combat capabilities of both countries to highlight the asymmetry of the military forces of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. It also attempted to cast doubt on Taiwan’s alliance with the United States.
Fear strategies and disinformation against politicians
It was also used to intimidate the Taiwanese society and lower morale. current armed conflicts in the worlde.g. war in Gaza. The Taiwanese were also threatened by the government’s supposed announcement conscription of all citizensincluding the elderly, and at the same time lies were spread that Taiwanese politicians were fleeing the island.
The victims manipulation aimed at Taiwan’s infosphere There were also politicians running in the election, then-presidential candidate William Lai and vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim. Lai was accused of corruption and false information was given about his personal life. The attacks on Bi-khim were built on the lie that the politician had dual citizenship—American and Taiwanese—which, under Taiwanese law, would have disqualified her from running in the election. In fact, Hsiao Bi-khim renounced her US citizenship in December 2023, but the narrative attributing attempted fraud to her was repeated on social media for months.
Positive assessment of Taiwan’s resistance to disinformation
As assessed by expert centers and the media after the elections, Taiwan coped exceptionally well with the onslaught of disinformation coming from the People’s Republic of China. The New York Times wrote in its post-election analysis that “China failed to influence Taiwanese elections”.
Cooperation of various entities in the fight against disinformation
According to Doublethink, the secret effectively building resistance to disinformation is the cooperation of society with fact-checking entities, media and academic centers. However, state support is also important. The report also mentions the government’s “2-2-2” rule, which states that within two hours of identifying a false claim or narrative, the designated ministry is to publish the content of the fake news and its debunking in social media in no more than 200 words.
Advantage Taiwanese model there is also the ability of different entities to cooperate dedicated to monitoring the flow of disinformation without getting in each other’s way. The report mentions the Science Media Center, an entity that supports journalists with technical and academic knowledge when needed, the Fake News Cleaner team that educates seniors so they can recognize manipulations lurking online, and the Doublethink Lab as an analytical center that studies the behaviors and entities spreading disinformation.
Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation
In January, Taiwanese people had to deal not only with disinformation in traditional media, but also content generated with the help of artificial intelligence (AI), which constitute one of the greatest challenges for all democratic states today. Exposing deepfakes They were taking care of fact-checking organizations. Typically, the issue involved fake news programs moderated by AI-generated characters. Often, the fake moderators were digital clones of established journalists.
According to the report, Taiwan’s additional strength is that most entities were able to recognize the threat of PRC manipulation and respond appropriately. However, earlier Doublethink Lab reports also indicated coordinated actions in Taiwan by Chinese and Russian actors, which became particularly visible after the Russian attack on Ukraine. One of the most heavily exploited narratives was the emphasis on Taiwan’s alleged isolation and the fragility of the alliance with the US in the face of a possible armed conflict with the PRC. The same mechanism, but with regard to Ukraine and Western countries, was used by the Russian Federation at the beginning of the war.
According to the report’s author, analyst Ben Graham Jones, the Taiwanese model, based on the island’s experience, can not only provide support to other countries, but also mobilize them to share their ideas on building universal social resilience to FIMI. Such exchange is to “benefit the global community of democratic states.”
The Global Importance of the Taiwan Model
As the analyst pointed out in a comment for the website FakeHunter PAP: “Taiwan’s Model for Building Resilience to FIMI It is a protective umbrella with Taiwanese characteristics, but the storm is global” so the solutions that worked in Taiwan can also be used in other countries.
Speaking about the problems with disinformation, which are visible in Taiwan as well as in Poland, the analyst called both countries “lighthouses on the front line of foreign information operations.” He also emphasized the special role of Poland’s experience in combating foreign influence.
Ben Graham Jones specializes in analyzing elections and challenges related to the fair conduct of electoral processes. He has participated in over thirty observation, assistance and advisory missions, including as head of mission, media and social media analyst and online campaign analyst. (PAP)
Author of the text: Olga Doleśniak-Harczuk
